U.S. ex rel. Badr v. Triple Canopy, Inc., an intervened case arising out of the Fourth Circuit, has been one of the more closely-watched recent FCA cases. Previously, the Fourth Circuit held that the government’s complaint properly alleged an FCA claim and could survive Triple Canopy’s motion to dismiss. That ruling was subsequently vacated by the Supreme Court following its decision in Universal Health Services, Inc. v. U.S. ex rel. Escobar, which we covered here and here. On May 16, 2017, the Fourth Circuit issued its opinion on remand, finding that the complaint satisfied the pleading standards set forth in Escobar and re-affirming its conclusion that the complaint adequately stated an FCA claim.

Continue Reading Fourth Circuit Re-Affirms Sufficiency of Triple Canopy Complaint

In June, the Supreme Court issued Universal Health Services, Inc. v. U.S. ex rel. Escobar, a landmark opinion in which the Supreme Court addressed the standard for pleading materiality in FCA implied certification cases.  The Supreme Court ultimately remanded the case to the First Circuit to resolve in the first instance whether the alleged violations met that standard, and last week, the First Circuit gave its answer: the violations were material.

Continue Reading On Remand, First Circuit Finds Violations in Escobar Were Material

The United State District Court for the Eastern District of New York recently dismissed an FCA complaint for failing to plead materiality under the standard announced in Universal Health Services, Inc. v. U.S. ex rel. Escobar, the Supreme Court’s landmark FCA opinion issued in June of this year. The case, U.S. ex rel. Lee v. Northern Adult Daily Health Care Center, 13-cv-4933, 2016 WL 4703653 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2016), becomes one of the first to substantively apply Escobar and highlights the barrier the FCA’s materiality requirement poses to FCA relators in the wake of the Supreme Court’s ruling. It also suggests ways in which courts already are divided in their interpretation of Escobar.

Continue Reading Citing Escobar, Court Dismisses Complaint that Alleged Violation of Conditions of Payment

On July 18, 2016, the United States District Court for the Northern District of California issued one of the first post-Escobar decisions addressing a motion to dismiss FCA allegations on grounds that the complaint did not satisfy Rule 9(b)’s pleading standard.  In the intervened case, the United States alleged that diagnostic sleep studies were performed in locations that violated federal law and/or were performed by technicians who were not licensed or certified.  The United States proceeded on multiple FCA theories (including factual falsity, express false certification, fraud in the inducement, and implied false certification).

Continue Reading Escobar Forestalls Government’s Allegations in Intervened Case

The Seventh Circuit’s rejection of the implied certification theory of liability gave rise, in part, to the circuit split resolved by the Supreme Court’s opinion in Escobar.  In its first FCA decision since the Supreme Court’s opinion – U.S. ex rel. Sheet Metal Workers International Association v. Horning Investments, LLC, the Seventh Circuit sidestepped the question of whether the relator’s allegations that a government contractor’s certification of compliance with the Davis-Bacon Act amounted to an implied false certification sufficient to give rise to FCA liability.  Rather than tackle the implications of Escobar, the Seventh Circuit affirmed entry of summary judgment in favor of the contractor, explaining that the defendant’s conduct amounted to certifying compliance with an ambiguous statutory obligation and, therefore, did not constitute a “knowing” violation of the FCA.

Continue Reading Seventh Circuit Sidesteps Escobar; Boots FCA Claims for Lack of Knowledge

On June 16, 2016, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its much-anticipated opinion in Universal Health Services, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar regarding the implied certification theory of False Claims Act (FCA) liability.  The Court’s unanimous opinion, drafted by Justice Clarence Thomas, is significant in three respects, detailed further below:  (1) the Court ruled that, in certain circumstances, the implied certification theory can be a basis for FCA liability; (2) the Court held that an express condition of payment in a statutory, regulatory or contractual requirement is relevant—but “not automatically dispositive”—in determining FCA liability; and (3) the Court clarified how the FCA’s materiality requirement should be enforced by lower courts addressing FCA suits premised on an implied false certification theory.

Continue Reading In Escobar, Supreme Court Endorses, but “Materially” Refines, Implied Certification Theory of False Claims Act Liability