United States Supreme Court

On March 19, 2019, the Supreme Court heard arguments in Cochise Consultancy Inc. v. United States, ex rel. Hunt regarding how the False Claims Act’s (FCA) statute of limitations applies in qui tam actions brought by a private relator in which the government declined to intervene. The Court heard lively arguments regarding a statute that has undoubtedly confused many. After oral argument, the Court appears poised to conclude that relators may appropriately take advantage of a longer limitations period.

FCA Statute of Limitations Raises Questions Regarding How and When It Should be Tolled

The FCA’s statute of limitations provision, 31 U.S.C. § 3731(b), states that a civil action may not be brought under the FCA:

  1. more than six years after the date on which the violation of section 3729 is committed, or
  2. more than three years after the date when facts material to the right of action are known or should have been known by the official of the United States charged with responsibility to act in the circumstances, but in no event more than 10 years after the date on which the violation is committed, whichever occurs last.


Continue Reading

On January 14, 2019, Intermountain Healthcare, Inc. and Intermountain Medical Center (Intermountain) filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court.  Intermountain’s petition comes after the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed a district court’s grant of Intermountain’s motion to dismiss.  In relevant part, the district court concluded that the relator failed to identify any company employees with knowledge of the alleged fraud or when any employees knew about the fraud.  The Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that the relator need not allege those facts because they were in the defendant’s exclusive control and that allegations of knowledge need only be pleaded generally.

Intermountain’s petition raises two questions:

  • Can a plaintiff avoid Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b)’s pleading requirements by asserting that only the defendant possesses the information needed to meet those requirements?
  • Do the False Claims Act’s (FCA) qui tam provisions violate the Appointments Clause of Article II of the U.S. Constitution?

Both questions have previously appeared in petitions for writ of certiorari, but neither question has been addressed by the Supreme Court.  See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari, U.S. ex rel. Joshi v. St. Luke’s Hospital, Inc. (denied Oct. 2, 2006); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, GPM Gas Corp. et al. v. U.S. ex rel. Grynberg (denied Apr. 22, 2002).


Continue Reading

In 2016, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down its decision in Universal Health Services, Inc. v. U.S. ex rel. Escobar confirming the viability of the implied false certification theory in False Claims Act (FCA) cases and mandating that claims brought pursuant to that theory satisfy “demanding” materiality and scienter requirements.  As discussed in a prior post, since Escobar, the U.S. Courts of Appeals have wrestled with analyzing and applying the materiality and scienter requirements discussed in the Supreme Court’s opinion, resulting in a number of recent petitions for writ of certiorari filed with the Supreme Court seeking clarification of the Escobar mandates.

In one of its first actions of 2019, the Supreme Court recently denied petitions in two closely-watched FCA cases, U.S. ex rel. Harman v. Trinity Industries, Inc., and Gilead Sciences Inc. v. U.S. ex rel. Campie.

$660 Million Reversal Stands in Harman

The plaintiff-relator in Harman sought review from the Supreme Court after the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed a $660 million jury verdict, holding that the relator failed to prove that the defendant’s alleged misrepresentations were material to government’s payment decisions.  The relator in Harman claimed that the defendant produced and sold defective highway guardrails to various states, causing them to submit fraudulent claims for reimbursement to the federal government.  However, evidence was presented that the Federal Highway Administration was aware of the alleged defects but continued to pay for the guardrails despite their non-compliance.  Relying on Escobar, the Fifth Circuit held that relator failed to overcome such “strong evidence” that the requirements at issue were not material.   The Supreme Court’s recent denial of the relator’s petition leaves intact the Fifth Circuit’s judgment and precedential opinion, providing a potential defense to FCA defendants in cases where the government was aware of certain conduct but continued to pay claims.


Continue Reading

On November 30, 2018, the Solicitor General of the United States filed an amicus curiae brief in the closely watched False Claims Act (FCA) lawsuit, Gilead Sciences Inc. v. U.S. ex rel. Campie. In what appears to be an unprecedented move, the Solicitor General stated in an amicus brief filed with the Supreme Court – without any prior indication – that the Department of Justice (DOJ) will move to dismiss the relator’s complaint if the case is remanded back to the district court because allowing the case to proceed “would impinge on agency decision making and discretion and would disserve the interests of the United States.”

Defendant Gilead Seeks Review of Ninth Circuit Decision

Two relators filed an FCA lawsuit against Gilead Sciences, Inc. in 2010 alleging that the pharmaceutical manufacturer misrepresented to the government that it obtained an active ingredient in three of its HIV drugs from specifically approved facilities. The relators also allege that Gilead provided false or inaccurate information to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in an attempt to gain approval to receive ingredients from an alternate facility. The relators argue that the government would not have reimbursed Gilead for the drugs at issue had it known the truth about the source of the drugs’ active ingredients.
Continue Reading

On November 16, 2018, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in Cochise Consultancy, Inc. v. U.S. ex rel. Hunt, agreeing to decide how the FCA’s statute of limitations applies in qui tam actions brought by a private relator in which the government declined to intervene. The Court’s decision in Hunt should bring sorely needed clarity to a question that has deeply divided the federal courts of appeals.

The Supreme Court Will Review the Eleventh Circuit’s Interpretation of 31 U.S.C. § 3731(b)(2)

The FCA’s statute of limitations provision, 31 U.S.C. § 3731(b), states that a civil action may not be brought under the FCA:

  • more than 6 years after the date on which the violation of section 3729 is committed, or
  • more than 3 years after the date when facts material to the right of action are known or should have been known by the official of the United States charged with responsibility to act in the circumstances, but in no event more than 10 years after the date on which the violation is committed,

whichever occurs last.

The specific question presented in Hunt is whether § 3731(b)(2), which operates as a tolling provision to the six-year limitations period of § 3731(b)(1), applies to FCA actions brought by a relator in which the government declined to intervene, and if so, whether the government’s knowledge or the relator’s knowledge is the relevant trigger for the limitations period.


Continue Reading

On Tuesday, November 20, 2018, Defendants-Petitioners Brookdale Senior Living Communities, Inc. et al. (Brookdale) filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court asking the Court to resolve circuit splits regarding enforcement of the materiality and scienter elements of the False Claims Act (FCA) in cases involving the implied false certification theory of liability. The relator in the case, styled Brookdale Senior Living Communities, Inc. v. U.S. ex rel. Prather, is a former Brookdale utilization review nurse who alleges that Brookdale did not obtain physician signatures on home health certifications as soon as possible after the physician established a plan of care, in violation of Medicare regulations. The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee previously dismissed the lawsuit for failure to plead falsity, but the case was revived on appeal by a divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which held that the relator adequately pleaded a regulatory violation. After the relator amended her complaint in light of the Supreme Court’s 2016 decision in Universal Health Services, Inc. v. U.S. ex rel. Escobar, which addressed the FCA’s materiality requirement, the district court dismissed the case for failure to plead materiality. On appeal, however, the Sixth Circuit again reversed in a 2-1 decision, finding that the relator adequately pleaded materiality and scienter.
Continue Reading

Matt Curley Provides Insight on Supreme Court's Refusal to Weigh In on Pleading of FCA SuitsBass, Berry & Sims attorney Matt Curley provided insight to Law360 for an article analyzing the Supreme Court’s decision to deny certiorari concerning a case that may have addressed the discrepancies surrounding how False Claims Act (FCA) suits are pleaded. There is currently a split within the federal appellate courts regarding how the heightened pleading requirements of Rule 9(b) should be applied to FCA claims.

Continue Reading

The FCA continues to be the federal government’s primary civil enforcement tool for investigating allegations that healthcare providers or government contractors defrauded the federal government. In the coming weeks, we will take a closer look at recent legal developments involving the FCA. This week, we examine the Supreme Court’s opinion in Escobar and its impact on the question of the FCA’s materiality requirement.

In addition to tackling the viability of the implied certification theory of liability in Escobar, the Supreme Court also held that the FCA does not restrict liability to noncompliance with express conditions of payment, stating that “[w]hether a provision is labeled a condition of payment is relevant to but not dispositive of the materiality inquiry.”  The Supreme Court explained that any concerns about fair notice or open-ended liability without such a restriction on liability can be addressed through “strict enforcement” of the FCA’s “demanding” and “rigorous” materiality requirement, as well as the FCA’s scienter requirement. 


Continue Reading

The Supreme Court held that a relator’s breach of the seal in a qui tam case does not require mandatory dismissal of the complaint, but the Court declined to articulate what factors are appropriate to consider in determining whether dismissal is appropriate.  The Court wrote only that appropriateness of dismissal in a given case should be left to the sound discretion of the district court. The district court in this case had not abused its discretion in declining to dismiss the case, and the appropriate test could be taken up in future cases.
Continue Reading

On June 16, 2016, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its much-anticipated opinion in Universal Health Services, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar regarding the implied certification theory of False Claims Act (FCA) liability.  The Court’s unanimous opinion, drafted by Justice Clarence Thomas, is significant in three respects, detailed further below:  (1) the Court ruled that, in certain circumstances, the implied certification theory can be a basis for FCA liability; (2) the Court held that an express condition of payment in a statutory, regulatory or contractual requirement is relevant—but “not automatically dispositive”—in determining FCA liability; and (3) the Court clarified how the FCA’s materiality requirement should be enforced by lower courts addressing FCA suits premised on an implied false certification theory.

Continue Reading